A distant predecessor of Staffan de Mistura, Christopher Ross (2009-2017), wanted to engage in “consultations with a group of ‘respected’ Maghreb representatives on the Sahara issue.” The current personal envoy, de Mistura, advocated extending the consultations to other countries. Neither then, nor now, have there been any notable results or any impact whatsoever from these so-called expanded consultations on the UN process.
But the UN Secretary-General Personal Envoy for the Sahara was just in Pretoria, South Africa. An intriguing visit because it doesn’t fit into any clearly defined diplomatic box.
So what did de Mistura do in Pretoria? South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor, who invited and received him on January 31, 2024, described the meeting as “useful.” But she also referred to the “approaches” and “proposals” that de Mistura had put forward on the Moroccan Sahara issue, pointing out that Pretoria would “need time” to give its feedback.
What “approaches” and “proposals” could the personal envoy have made, and why did he make them specifically to a country, South Africa, which, from Morocco’s point of view, is the last country to be asked about the issue? In what capacity is Pretoria involved? South Africa is not a concerned or interested party and does not figure in the “Group of Friends of Western Sahara.” On the contrary, it recognizes the so-called “SADR,” openly displays hostility to Morocco, and actively militates against the Kingdom’s interests.
It is hard to imagine that de Mistura, a seasoned diplomat, would have gone to Pretoria without even informing Rabat. The absence of any official reaction in Morocco could be interpreted either as an expression of embarrassment or as a “wait and see” attitude. Unless, that is, the Pandor-de Mistura meeting is just one visible part of a wider process of which Rabat is aware and in which the Moroccan diplomacy is a stakeholder.
The UN Secretary-General spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, said of de Mistura: “His mandate is also to talk to whoever he thinks needs to be talked to, member states and others, to move the process forward.” He also made a sibylline statement: “Of course, some things . . . have to be engaged in quiet diplomacy.”
Between a South African minister who wants to take her time in responding to the UN’s proposals and Stéphane Dujarric, who speaks of the need for “quiet diplomacy,” there is every reason to believe that a great deal of maneuvering is going on behind the scenes.
It is worth bearing in mind the double tour of the region by an official of the US State Department. Joshua Harris visited Rabat and Algiers twice, successively in September and December, 2023. Nothing, or almost nothing, leaked out about Harris’ talks in the two capitals. It is not impossible to think that the personal envoy’s approach and his visit to Pretoria are part of the American approach.
At this stage, three possibilities can be envisaged:
– South African mediation is out of the question since Pretoria is disqualified by its unconditional support for the Polisario.
– On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that South Africa will be called upon to convince the Polisario if indeed it is necessary to convince this group of anything at all, as this task legitimately and logically falls to the country that harbors and arms the militias.
– The only option left is for the UN to seek South Africa’s benevolent neutrality or, better still, to secure its support for a political solution.
It means that this solution has been agreed upon by the parties directly concerned, including Algeria. It also means that Pretoria has succeeded in interfering in the dispute.
Addressing South Africa, rather than any other state, makes sense given that this country is, after Algeria, the second bête noire of Morocco’s territorial integrity concern and the most active in international forums.
That said, isn’t the UN giving South Africa more importance than it really has? South African diplomacy has clearly shown that it has a certain capacity for nuisance, but reality has also shown the limits of Pretoria’s activism, which has never succeeded at getting Morocco into trouble in New York, Geneva, or Addis Ababa.
Wisdom dictates that, whenever possible, potential disputes should be neutralized, consensus should be sought, and the susceptibilities of all parties should be spared. This appears to be de Mistura’s method, and he would be well advised to use it, provided that the parameters set by the Security Council are scrupulously respected.
The same wisdom also dictates the utmost mistrust of entry into the fray of an eminently hostile country from which Morocco cannot expect any gift.
* Ali Achour is a Moroccan diplomat, writer, and former Ambassador to Venezuela, Norway, Brazil and the Holy See (Rome). He is the author of “Moroccan Sahara: 20 Questions To Understand,” ” Hassan II Said”, and “Diplomacy in the Morocco of Yesteryear.”