Governing systems in the Arab world–that is, with geographical reference to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) primarily–have certainly been the subject of stereotypes throughout history. As the Western concept of “democracy” has become more commonplace throughout the world–with actual implementation by country of course resulting in a variety of phenotypes dependent on that country’s historical development—many have rushed to judgement that this is necessarily the most appropriate form of government for all the world’s citizens.
In actuality, nothing could be further from the truth, and this region tends to epitomize that fact. Perhaps at the heart of this argument is the concept of one’s motivation to achieve. Of course, one might ask, “Achieve what?” As most economies of the world encourage free market dynamics, capitalism would dictate that the simple answer to that question is “money,” or at least means to survive.
While some individuals maintain that they would happily eschew personal financial resources for intellectual/professional satisfaction or even for collective social justice, the bottom line is that everyone has to put food on the table. And in the Arab sphere of influence, the most relevant determinant in solving that dilemma of simply being able to earn a living seems not to be one of privatization or government control, nor one of individualistic or collectivist mindsets; but rather, one of republican or monarchist governmental systems.
Since European colonial rule officially ended across the MENA region some six decades ago, various nations within the region offer a striking contrast in what would be considered sociopolitical and socioeconomic success—or lack thereof—stories. What we can see is that about a half dozen nations in particular defy the stereotype that this success simply cannot occur under what Western standards describe typically as “autocratic” rule; whereas three “representative democracies” (in actuality in name only) are headed for disaster.
Political systems obviously must obviously hold a certain degree of legitimacy–the belief that the authority is legal, competent, and worthy of respect–in the eyes of its citizens. The nations of Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Oman all have either monarchist or sultanate forms of government, which Western standards would be tempted to cast in pejorative terms. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, additionally, employ political systems in which power is quite concentrated in a very small group, as well.
Conversely, Algeria (a multi-party republic with presidential elections); Tunisia (a presidential republic with a bicameral parliament); and Egypt (democratic semi-presidential republic) technically employ more democracy on paper, yet in practice could easily be considered DINOs (Democracies in Name Only).
Interestingly, the prognosis for the former group of countries mentioned is far different from that of the latter, and clearly defies this Western concept that democracy—as defined by the West, of course—always works best at modernizing, legitimizing, and stabilizing nations regardless of their historical context.
How might we go about defining the concept of a “successful” government, then? One way to measure success might be to revisit the concept of legitimacy; in other words, how competent is that government in allocating sufficient resources to the greatest possible number of its citizens so that they may escape or at least mitigate poverty? Clearly, legitimacy depends on the extent to which individual citizens feel they are able to achieve a happy—or at least stress-free—life, central to which of course is simply putting food on the table.
The Nordic bloc (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland) take the top five spots for world’s happiest countries, and certainly this emanates from its citizens’ extraordinary level of trust in their respective governments to allocate resources adequately to all (versus the Darwinist socioeconomic perspective more commonplace in the virtually unregulated market economy found in the United States).
Though there are the occasional rumblings of resentment of foreigners usurping the social safety net, by and large it is indeed this pervasive confidence in government which provides such legitimacy.
The purpose of this dialogue is not to extoll the virtues of socialism and expose the demons of capitalism; however, moving from a traditional society whereby the State maintains and distributes all the wealth to a model of privatization has most assuredly not improved Arab economies.
Similarly, what we find in the Kingdoms of Morocco and Saudi Arabia and in the Sultanate of Oman are the following characteristics: an absolute trust in and kinship with the nations’ supreme rulers; increased international trade as of late resulting in higher GDP-per capita growth rates and presence of the middle class than anywhere else in the MENA region; and steps taken in the name of social justice objectives, particularly with respect to Morocco (human rights, women’s rights, ethnic minority-and religious rights, human development, and environmentally friendly corporate practices).
These countries are clearly on the upswing economically, with tourism increasing dramatically in recent years, and with an air of international legitimacy to go along with it, as evidenced by various international political, cultural, and athletic event hosting being delegated to Morocco and Saudi Arabia, in particular.
Certainly, if economic prosperity can be considered a pillar of legitimacy, then oil-rich Saudi Arabia—along with the other allegedly “autocratic” Gulf Sates of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE—could be considered models of success.
It should be said that over 90% of the Moroccan and Saudi populace approve of their respective monarchies. Could it be because of the perception that these monarchs genuinely do care about the well-being of the citizenry, as evidenced by strengthened social “safety nets” implemented with a portion of the money the government has earned from each country’s top exports.
In contrast, Algeria, while also holding vast oil reserves which could have—if utilized wisely– made its citizens supremely wealthy, has floundered between military dictatorship and presidential buffoonery since its independence from France, resulting in grossly unequal distribution of wealth and a clear lack of legitimacy across not only the international community but domestically, as well.
As we all know, the “Arab Spring” was initiated in Tunisia by Ben Ali’s ousting, but what has turned out to be “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” has concurrently resulted in an economically stagnated/chaotic and repressive society in which the very rationale for his ousting—an alleged rejection of tyranny—has been shown to be a model of hypocrisy. Hardly a month goes by in which one of Saied’s opponents is not handed down a lifetime sentence for an oppositional viewpoint.
In rounding out the top three North African facades of democracy, lest we forget Egypt, where purchasing power has plummeted to virtually the weakest in the world, and where the perceived civic risk undertaken by criticizing the government has made the atmosphere in Cairo virtually unrecognizable from that of Pyongyang.
Therefore, it is absolutely fair to say that republicanism which has never enjoyed a suitable foundation—and specifically, which has resulted from military coups—has served countries in the Arab World far worse than have monarchies, sultanates, emirates in lending an aura of political legitimacy, stability, and practicality to their respective citizenry.
Do nepotism, cronyism, corruption, and even human rights violations–common Western criticisms of “autocratic” governments—exist in political systems which are considered undemocratic by Western standards?
Of course they do; however, the point is that the absence of traditionally-defined democracy does not by itself necessitate the co-occurrence of such characteristics, and that such practices are often much more pervasive in the “paper democracies” previously mentioned. We have seen that in these fledgling “democracies” in this region that such prevalence—and ultimately the quality of its citizens’ lives—is often far worse. Any other interpretation of events would simply reek of Orwellian hypocrisy.
*Prof. Youcef Hdouch is the head of the English department at the Faculty of Languages, Letters and Arts – Ibn Tofail University. He is also Advisor to the President of the University.