Such a multitude of unforeseen regional and international developments have occurred since the Abraham Accords were brokered by the U.S. in 2020, that Morocco might be wise to consider reevaluating the enthusiasm at the resumption of ties with Israel.
One factor affecting this assertion—albeit an indirect one—is Saudi Arabia’s apparent reconciliation with Iran. The Atlantic Council—a self-described American think tank specializing in international relations—argued in a feature last week that the historic Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian/Safavid tensions originally shaping Arabian Peninsula nations’ antipathy toward Iran–which boiled over in Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascension to power in 1979—have taken a back seat to Saudi Arabia’s desire to posture itself as a more relevant player economically and strategically in the region.
Specifically, the Kingdom has interests in developing a civilian nuclear power program, and in 2008 signed a MoU as such with the United States. In the absence of such nuclear assistance and security pledges from the U.S., it is likely to seek support elsewhere from regimes considered unfriendly to American interests: Iran, Russia, and China.
However, as the U.S. is currently preoccupied with Russia-Ukraine Crisis—and with neutralizing China’s desire for a multipolar balance of power—Saudi reconciliation with Iran already started to occur last month with the restoration of diplomatic ties. As the U.S. remains distracted with what it considers to be other priorities, the prognosis for a mutually beneficial Saudi-Iranian relationship looks rosier by the day.
Political allies and enemies are and always have been redefined constantly in the world. However, the implications for Morocco have the potential to be especially startling.
Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan, in particular, all depend on Saudi assistance of some sort—whether it be of an economic or military nature, or both–in the maintenance of successful domestic agendas and in maintaining regional stability. Clearly, Morocco especially has foreign affairs concerns as they relate to Iran, and the potential for a sustained Riyadh-Teheran alliance would have to raise eyebrows.
Additionally, as Saudi Arabia waits for the above-referenced incentives from the U.S. as a likely minimal condition for reversing its recent “détente” with Iran, Morocco, too, is currently seeking and should indeed continue to seek more than the lukewarm support it has recently received from Washington regarding its own best interests.
Specifically, Morocco’s call for the U.S. to support the former’s sovereignty more vociferously over Sahara–specifically by opening an embassy in Dakhla as promised–has fallen on deaf ears.
Furthermore, it appears to have necessitated unspeakable atrocities by Israel’s far-right government against Palestinians–during the recent Holy Month of Ramadan, no less–for an American condemnation.
These factors have undoubtedly played a role in the postponement of the most recent iteration of the Negev Summit, with Morocco now focusing exclusively on military and industrial exchanges with Israel.
If the U.S. wants both the containment of Iranian economic and military influence and therefore the deterrence of terroristic influences in the region, and also the smooth progression of normalized Israeli relations among the more moderate/progressive Arab nations, then it will need to incent Riyadh and Rabat to move on these issues. The two are irrevocably intertwined.