Long before the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the Moroccan security services alerted the international community at various forums to the interest of “Al Qaeda” in Africa as a potential operational area, which risks becoming a substitute “Malistan” for Afghanistan. This observation was confirmed by the strikes of this terrorist nebula in 1998 against the American embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar Essalam (Tanzania), followed by the targeting of Israeli tourist interests in Mombasa (Kenya).
These malicious acts were concomitant with the installation of veterans of ‘Al Qaeda’, the ‘Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group’ and the ‘Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’ in the Sahel-Saharan zone, particularly in Mauritania, at the same time as the entrenchment of fighters of the Algerian ‘ex-Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by the French acronym GSPC),’ beyond Algeria’s southern borders, before gradually turning the Sahel zone into a melting pot for various types of terrorists, acting under the banner of “Al-Qaeda”, which dictates its law over a vast territory, from Mauritania to Niger, passing through northern Mali.
Despite the deployment of several anti-terrorist mechanisms in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the “MINUSMA” (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), the “MOC” (Operational Coordination Mechanism), the “Serval” and “Barkhane” operations (Franco-Malian military forces) and the “G5 Sahel” in the Sahel region, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)” in Central Africa (comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon), the African landscape is still very much affected by the proliferation of terrorist groups claiming to be affiliated with “Al-Qaeda” or “Daech” and whose activism is increasing exponentially, jeopardising the stabilisation of several countries on the continent.
The losses that these terrorist groups have suffered through the liquidation of several of their high-ranking operatives, such as Abdelmalek Droukdel (ex-emir of “AQIM”, neutralized on 6/3/2020 by French forces, succeeded by the Algerian Yazid Mebark known as ”Abu Youssef al Annabi”, ex-spokesperson of ”AQIM”), have not affected the nuisance capacity of such groups in the Sahel, which take advantage of a favourable climate to ensure the control of these territories.
Indeed, the political instability of the Sahel countries and the permeability of their borders play into the hands of the Sahelian interfaces of ‘Daech’ and ‘Al-Qaeda’, which have a definite foothold among the local populations, through various interests and complicities. In a so-called lawless zone, these terrorist entities are becoming key players in all kinds of trafficking, from which they make a profit, as much as from the ransoms of Western hostages, in order to equip themselves with a foolproof arsenal of weapons, a large part of which has been looted from Libyan barracks.
Thus, the “support group for Islam and Muslims” “JNIM” (“Jama’at Nousrat al Islam wal Mouslimin”, an umbrella coalition of Al-Qaeda-aligned groups headed by the Tuareg Iyad Ag-Ghaly), which has been able to make the most of the reinforcements of Tuareg elements of the “National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad” (MNLA), and the “The Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies” (GATIA) to inflict heavy defeats on the Sahelian branch of “Daech”, ambitions to drive their fighters out of the Sahel, with the aim of establishing in northern Mali, an “Islamic emirate” to be named “ولاية أزواد الإسلامية” [E.d, the Azawad Islamic Wilayah], inspired by the model of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Also, the withdrawal of French forces deployed in the framework of the “Barkhane” operation could benefit this terrorist entity, which harbors ambitions to advance into other countries in the sub-region, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea.
For its part, the branch of “Daech” the “ISGS”- Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (of its ex-emir, the « element » of the “polisario front”, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui”, who died during an operation carried out by the French army, and led by Mohamed Ibrahim al Salem alias “Abba Sahraoui” alias “Abu Mohamed al Muhajer”) has been raised to the rank of a full-fledged “Wilaya”, enjoying administrative independence from the Daechian office in West Africa, following an announcement by the leadership of “Daech”, having replaced its former name by that of “Sahelian Wilayah of the Islamic State” (WSEI, French Acronym).
In West and Central Africa, the local “Daech” outfit named “Islamic State in West Africa” (ISWAP) and “Islamic State Wilaya in Central Africa” (ISCAP) have intensified since 2018, their attacks against neuralgic sites in the countries, especially in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Morocco, which bears the full brunt of the political instability of its regional neighborhood, including the corrosive effects of the Malian quagmire, has made efforts through its security services in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, maintaining sustained cooperation with regional partners, exchange of operational intelligence and assistance in the event of terrorist attacks. In this context, the Moroccan services have participated in the elucidation of the case of the attack on the seaside site of “Grand-Bassam” in Ivory Coast, perpetrated on 3/13/2016.
Similarly, the operational contribution of the Moroccan security services has been decisive in anti-terrorist operations conducted in the Sahel by French forces against terrorist groups, allowing, among other things, the arrest and neutralization of Moroccan operatives, like Ali Maychou (senior executive of the “Group of support for Islam and Muslims” -JNIM- shot in October 2019, by the French armed forces in Mali) and M’hammed el Mrabat (member of the “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara”, arrested in May 2020, in Mali).
Also, Morocco is engaged, through military and experts in three UN missions in Africa, namely “MONUSCO” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), “MINUSCA” in the Central African Republic (CAR), and “UNMISS” in South Sudan.
Moreover, Moroccan services contribute continuously to the upgrading of skills and best practices for the benefit of some Sahel countries, through the organization of specialized training sessions, the objective being to make its partners benefit from the Moroccan experience in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.
The terrorist threat stemming from the Sahel has weighed for two decades on the security of the kingdom, insofar as several Moroccan fighters (about thirty) have joined the ranks of “AQIM” and the former “EIGS” (“Islamic State in the Greater Sahara”), where some of them have held positions of responsibility, while planning terrorist schemes inside the kingdom, such as the terrorist structure remotely controlled from Mali by “AQIM” operative Noureddine el Youbi (shot dead), dismantled in January 2011, against the backdrop of the seizure of a war arsenal in the Amgala region. In the same vein, the Moroccan security services have proceeded, on the eve of the launch of the operation “Serval”, to the dismantling (November and December 2012) of two transportation networks of nationals to the “jihad” in Mali, whose first contingents among the Moroccan volunteers, have convoyed batches of weapons from Libya where they underwent paramilitary training at the camps of “Ansar al Shariah”.
This risk is exacerbated by the increased activism within the Sahelian branch of “Daech” of a hundred or so fighters from the Tindouf camps who have family ties in the southern provinces of the kingdom, such as the former emir of the “ISGS” Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.
The resurgence of terrorist cells in the Sahel, especially with the migration of fighters from the Syrian-Iraqi area in 2014, since “the IS as an institution has disappeared in favor of a transnational ideology” (which has allowed the emergence of a new kind of fighters who can act as free electrons and commit acts of terrorism anywhere else in the world according to the process of ‘lone wolves’ or ‘Islamonauts’), continues to worry Morocco as this region is already infested mainly by Al Qaeda, AQIM, and EIGS – the latter two deriving their origins from the Algerian GIA (of the 90s) and GSPC which still operate in the Sahel. They have even proliferated, against all odds, at a time when the Algerian government benefited from more financial, logistical, and technical support as the leader of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.
The proliferation of firearms after the fall of the Gaddafi regime in the region, the porous borders that “facilitate travel and promote the free movement of terrorists throughout Africa,” combined with the precariousness and social instability, are all weakening factors that make terrorist groups feel safe. In the Sahel, there is an intersection between terrorist groups and criminal networks. The proliferation of firearms, drug trafficking, human trafficking, clandestine migration, and bartering between criminal networks and terrorist cells, make it a fertile environment that multiplies malicious acts.
Upstream of this threat, the polisario front, settled in the Tindouf camps in the Algerian Sahara finds the ideal incubator environment to promote its hostilities in Morocco and sow more instability throughout the region, given the high number of attacks perpetrated by the separatist Adnane Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, head of the IS, from 2016 to his death in 2021, in the tri-border area (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso). The certainty of the involvement of the polisario in terrorism in the Sahel began with the dismantling in August 2008 of a terrorist cell called “Fath Al Andalous” rooting for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). The investigation of this case by Moroccan Security services led to the arrest of individuals with jihadist credentials and experience in carrying weapons operating in Laayoune, Tangier, and Tetuan among other cities. It appeared, during the processing of this case, that the defendants were planning to organize attacks against MINURSO elements.
Today, more than ever, the risk of a resurgence of this scourge in the Sahel and Africa, in general, is linked to breakdowns in cooperation by concerned third-party security services, and growing anti-French sentiment where the current narratives of the former colonial power still draw on a colonial register at a time when global stability, since the migration of terrorist fighters from the Syrian-Iraqi zone depends on the stability of the Sahel and continued cooperation between all parties.
The Sahel has become a rear base to serve the devastating agenda of the IS globally and particularly, in the states around the Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast. This issue requires the involvement of all countries concerned with the region because on this mobilization depends the stability of all.
